

The Policy Brief Series has been produced under the Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security (PCCMHS) programme and is a product of joint collaboration between UN agencies, members of academia and civil society actors who have been active in the climate mobility space. This policy brief series will seek to contribute to the evidence-base on good practices in responding to climate change and disaster-related migration, displacement and planned relocation with particular focus on the role of the human security framework. The research in this brief was supported by Australian Research Council grant LP170101136

PUB2021/085/R | May 2021



Displaced children from Manam Island play in the water with their active volcanic homeland in the background. © IOM 2016/Mohammed MUSE

Policy Developments and Options to Address Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Risk in the Pacific Islands Region

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INTRODUCTION

Across the globe, the impacts of anthropogenic climate change will continue to influence and amplify human mobility. This report uses the term "human mobility" in preference to "migration" and others, in light of recent academic and policy discussions¹ on the need for the environmental change–migration nexus "to become better attuned to the actual practice and needs of those affected, capturing the diversity

of vulnerabilities, the different segments of agency and capabilities, and the contextualized patterns of environmentally–related migration."²

Early debates positioned climate–related mobility as a failure of in situ adaptation and a threat to national and human security. More recently, researchers, policymakers and affected communities have begun to

1 Hanne Wiegel, Ingrid Boas, and Jeroen Warner, (2019) "A Mobilities Perspective on Migration in the Context of Environmental Change" *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* 10:e610 and Ingrid Boas et al, "Climate Migration Myths" *Nature Climate Change* p.901–903.

2 Boas et al. above n1, p.901. Note that we employ terms such as "migration", "displacement" or "relocation" where they are specifically relevant or where they are used as such in the policy context.

identify alternative mobility futures where mobility can be a potential strategy to respond to climate risk with beneficial outcomes for adaptation and development,³ or where mobility is supported positively by incorporating adaptation and development policy and practice.⁴ There is now a clear need for policy, at a variety of scales, that incorporates the needs of people on the move and supports in situ adaptation for those who choose to stay.

The Pacific Islands region is at the forefront of bearing the impacts of climate change, of which human mobility in its various guises is one.⁵ The region is home to a number of low-lying small island countries, adding to distinct regional vulnerabilities. Given these vulnerabilities, the issue of both mobility and immobility has found traction in policy circles and policy instruments in the region, or among those concerned with the region. Despite its vulnerabilities, the Pacific Islands region is displaying its strengths and resilience by being at the forefront of policy development in the arena of mobility, and adaptation more broadly, in the context of climate risk.

In this policy brief, we chart the relevant policy developments in the Pacific Islands region,⁶ to evidence the multiple pathways by which mobility in the context of climate change is integrated in, or supported by, policy tools. It had been noted that, as recently as 2016, there was a dearth of dedicated policies in the region on climate mobilities.⁷ In fact, the scarcity of both regional and national policies on migration, displacement and relocation was identified then as contributing to a potential ad hoc approach to addressing and supporting movement, potentially leading to situations of maladaptation and calls for policy attention.⁸ More recently, dedicated policy has been emerging increasingly, and continues to emerge. As this is ahead of other regions, it may prove useful to

nations or regions also grappling with how to approach climate-related human mobility (or immobility) as a policy concern.

This policy brief was produced under the Australian Research Council funded Linkage project Transformative Human Mobilities in a Changing Climate (LP170101136). As part of this project, the reporting on policy developments presented here will be supplemented with applied research in a number of Pacific Island locations (Fiji, Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu), as well as in Australia (where possible given current restrictions on travel induced by the COVID-19 pandemic).

METHODOLOGY

This policy brief is based on analysis of existing, publicly accessible policy instruments available in English and identified and reviewed as of January 2021. It provides a comprehensive inventory of policies relevant to the nexus of mobility/immobility, development and climate change or disaster risk management in the Pacific Islands region. The instruments we looked at overwhelmingly precede the COVID-19 virus and thus they do not account for changes (including in policy) to mobility and immobility⁹ that have arisen from the global pandemic which commenced in 2019/20.

We examined the policy space in all Pacific Island countries (n=22; see Table 1; also Appendix 1), including those with governance links with metropolitan neighbours, as well as metropolitan neighbours themselves, in particular Australia and New Zealand (n=2; see Table 1), as they have policies of some relevance to considerations of Pacific mobility in the era of climate change. We conducted our research predominantly by looking at the domestic policy space in each country concerned, searching for pertinent instruments in the mobility, climate change or disaster,

3 Carol Farbotko, Celia McMichael, Olivia Dun, Hedda Ransan-Cooper, Karen E McNamara, and Fanny Thornton, (2018). "Transformative Mobilities in the Pacific: Promoting Adaptation and Development in a Changing Climate" 5 *Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies* 393–407 and Jürgen Scheffran, Elina Marmer and Papa Sow, (2012). "Migration as a Contribution to Resilience and Innovation in Climate Adaptation: Social Networks and Co-development in Northwest Africa" (2012) 33 *Applied Geography* 119–127.

4 Farbotko et al. above n3.

5 Samid Suliman, Carol Farbotko, Hedda Ransan-Cooper, Karen McNamara, Fanny Thornton, Celia McMichael, and Taukiei Kitara, (2019). "Indigenous (Im) mobilities in the Anthropocene" *Mobilities* 14:298–318.

6 As at early 2021. The policy space we consider here is constantly evolving.

7 Adele Thomas and Lisa Benjamin, (2018). "Policies and Mechanisms to Address Climate-induced Migration and Displacement in Pacific and Caribbean Small Island Developing States" *International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management* 10:86–104.

8 Ibid; also Elisa Fornale and Sophia Kagan, *Climate Change and Human Mobility in the Pacific Region: Plans, Policies and Lessons Learned* (World Bank, Washington, 2017) available at: www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/201712/KNOMAD_WP31_Climate%20Change%20and%20Human%20Mobility%20in%20the%20Pacific%20Region.pdf.

9 For example, Olivia Dun, Karen McNamara, Carol Farbotko, Celia McMichael, and Fanny Thornton, *Immobilised Solomon Islands Seasonal Workers* (DevPolicy Blog, 2020) available at: www.devpolicy.org/immobilised-solomon-islands-seasonal-workers-20200529-2/; Taukiei Kitara et al., "Reducing COVID-19 Risk through Population Relocation and Closed Borders: Effects of Pandemic Emergency Measures in a Small Island State" (Environmental Migration Portal, IOM, 2020) available at: www.environmentalmigration.iom.int/blogs/reducing-covid-19-risk-through-population-relocation-and-closed-borders-effects-pandemic.



IOM visits the remote village of Simbu province. © IOM 2016/Mohammed MUSE

and development arenas, mostly via the relevant national ministries' websites. We employed search terms including mobility, migration, displacement, relocation, and resettlement in establishing whether a policy instrument had relevance to our study. Where one of these terms appeared at least once in a context relevant to our study, we considered the policy instrument relevant. Dedicated policy instruments pertaining to mobility (or an aspect of it) in the context of climate change per se are still few in the Pacific Islands region (n=3), though they are undoubtedly emerging, as we evidence. For this reason, we also investigated policy instruments concerning climate change, disaster risk management, and development in the region more broadly, as we are aware that these frequently contain policy content pertinent to climate change-related mobility.¹⁰

This policy brief intends to capture, document and provide an overview of the diverse range of policies in this arena across the region. In that sense, this report does not intend to identify alternative policy options, although we do conclude with some recommendations that stem from our analysis, which policymakers or practitioners may wish to consider. The material presented here is largely quantitative rather than qualitative, whereby we report on, and quantitatively assess, the content of policy instruments. Researchers in our project will complement this with future qualitative data collection that delves into the lives of Pacific Islanders more in-depth to understand how these policies are influencing everyday life. This is to add a culturally situated approach that is sensitive to the sociohistorical context of the Pacific Islands people

in the region, and to engage deeper also with the important historical, spiritual, cultural and emotional aspects of climate mobility.

We present the data we gathered via the different policy spheres in which they have emerged – a. climate change/disaster risk management; b. development; c. climate mobility. The policy brief also presents data concerning various regional countries' geopolitical associations or unique immigration arrangements with other nation States, as they are relevant for purposes of climate mobility. Although our focus has been the national policy space, in a penultimate section we do also present some information about regional States' participation in international fora, especially the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where it is policy-relevant in the context of climate change and mobility.

10 For example, Upolu Lumā Vaai, *We Are Therefore We Live: Pacific Eco-relational Spirituality and Changing the Climate Change Story* (Toda Peace Institute, Policy Brief no 56, 2019) available at: www.toda.org/assets/files/resources/policy-briefs/t-pb-56_upolu-luma-vaai_we-are-therefore-we-live.pdf?v=0. Lilian Yamamoto, (2020). "Climate Relocation and Indigenous Culture Preservation in the Pacific Islands" *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 21:150–157, and Tammy Tabe, (2019). "Climate Change Migration and Displacement: Learning from Past Relocations in the Pacific" *Social Sciences* 8:218–236.

Table 1 presents our overall findings with regards to the national policy space, with an "√" indicating that we identified a relevant policy (at least one); a lack of an "√" indicating we did not identify a relevant policy, though there may be some emerging, including by the time this brief goes to press.

Table 1: Overview of national-level policies relevant to climate change-related mobility in the Pacific Islands region

Country / Territory	1. Climate Change and/or Disaster Risk Management Policy	2. Climate Change and/or Disaster Risk Management Policy with Mobility Dimension	3. Development Policy	4. Development Policy with Mobility Dimension	5. Dedicated National Climate Change/Disaster Mobility Policy	6. Dedicated Tie or Immigrations Arrangement with
American Samoa	√		√			United States
Cook Islands	√		√			New Zealand
Federal States of Micronesia	√		√			United States
Fiji	√	√	√		2	New Zealand
French Polynesia	√		√			France
Guam	√					United States
Kiribati	√	√	√	√*		New Zealand
Nauru	√		√			
New Caledonia	√		√			France
Niue	√	√				New Zealand
Northern Mariana Islands	√		√			United States
Palau	√		√			United States
Papua New Guinea	√		√	√		
Pitcairn Islands	√		√	√		United Kingdom
Marshall Islands	√		√	√		United States
Samoa	√		√			New Zealand
Solomon Islands	√		√	√		
Tokelau	√					New Zealand
Tonga	√		√	√*		New Zealand
Tuvalu	√		√	√*		New Zealand
Vanuatu	√		√	√*	1	
Wallis and Futuna Islands	√		√			France
Australia	√		√	√*		New Zealand
New Zealand	√		√	√*		Australia

* Labour migration scheme enabling or supporting labour market participation. Note that these are qualitatively different, ranging from small quota-based immigration channels to free associations.

In the following section we analyse the policies noted in Table 1 where there is overlap between at least two or more factors of mobility, climate change adaptation, and/or development (namely, that is policies in columns two, four and five of Table 1), as well as the unique ties we have mentioned above between some countries in the region (column six of Table one).

MOBILITY IN CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT POLICIES

Mobility in the context of climate change appears regularly in policy documents pertaining to climate change and disaster risk management in the Pacific Islands region. All island countries in the Pacific have a current (or have had a recent) policy framework, action plan, or similar instrument – albeit of differing lengths and levels of complexity – which guides strategy and response to climate change or recurring disasters, and their effects. Mobility appears in such instruments

with some regularity (n=10). We note that, with few exceptions (for instance, Nauru), nations without an association or dedicated link with another state (for example, New Zealand or United States) address mobility in climate change or disaster related policy; we surmise that this is at least partially on account of a lack of existing mobility channels that are available between those that have relevant ties.¹¹

Most often, policy instruments with a mobility dimension contained evidence of policy recognition of mobility challenges arising from climate change or natural disasters and their effects. For example, the 2019 Kiribati Climate Change Policy notes that sea level rise compounds livelihood challenges, which "may result in unavoidable migration from Kiribati, threatening its future existence as a nation."¹² Land scarcity and tenure arrangements, in the meantime, impede internal relocation.¹³ This issue is also picked up in Kiribati's more recent *Joint Implementation Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management 2019-2028* (KJIP), which notes amongst key national adaptation priorities those that relate to land and property risks stemming from reduction or disappearance as a result of the effects of climate change, for which property owners may have to be compensated.¹⁴ Samoa's *National Disaster Management Plan 2017–2020* mentions the need for finding durable displacement solutions (including preparedness, relocation, integration) as part of disaster prevention, preparedness, and response.¹⁵ And Tuvalu's *Te Kaniva: Tuvalu Climate Change Policy 2012–2021* policy highlights its status as a nation, its cultural identity and the need to build its capacity to ensure a safe, resilient and prosperous future. Protection of sovereignty is highlighted but so is the need for migration and resettlement, both internal and external, so that Tuvaluans may have a safe place to live.¹⁶

What was less apparent where mobility concerns arose in policy instruments pertaining to climate change or disaster risk management was concrete or detailed policy direction to respond to the highlighted mobility challenges. In other words, treatment of mobility was by and large relatively generic and noted amongst other policy priorities. For example, the afore-mentioned *Kiribati Climate Change Policy* notes broadly that its response to what otherwise amounts to "unavoidable migration" should be the integration of coastal security measures in its long-term development planning, in an effort to support a growing population and its development needs, acknowledging also its existing lack in coastal engineering capacity, however.¹⁷ The policy also notes, broadly, that Kiribati must develop financial and technological capacity to counter loss and damage and with it the displacement and relocation consequences of climate change,¹⁸ and that responding to increasing disasters might involve humanitarian response.¹⁹ Samoa's *National Disaster Management Plan* notes that displacement solutions must be "durable", broadly identified as "return to places of origin, local integration or resettlement",²⁰ and that relocation must be based upon the formulation of public policy.²¹ This Plan states that in response to disasters, people might have to be evacuated or rescued, but family separation should be avoided.²² It also specifies that food security and health-care provisions must be provided as a priority in any post-disaster context involving displaced persons.²³ The Plan does go so far as to assign some responsibilities pertaining to displaced persons in the disaster context to public authorities – safety and property security to the Police Commissioner and emergency assistance to the Ministry of Customs and Revenue.²⁴ Tuvalu's *Te Kaniva* policy notes strategies for responding to anticipated migration or resettlement, which include securing places to live, enhancing resilience and preparedness,

11 More in the section on Associations and Immigration Channels below; also, e.g., Kees van der Geest et al. (2020). "Climate Change, Ecosystem Services and Migration in the Marshall Islands: Are They Related?" *Climatic Change*, 161:109–127; Sergio Olmos, "Micronesia Climate Refugees Increasingly Move to Oregon", *Portland Tribune* (21 July 2020), available at: www.pamplinmedia.com/pt/9-news/474347-381743-micronesia-climate-refugees-increasingly-relocate-to-oregon.

12 Government of Kiribati, *Kiribati Climate Change Policy*, 12, available at: extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/kir193352.pdf.

13 *Ibid.*, p.9.

14 Government of Kiribati, (2020). *Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (KJIP) 2019-2028* (2020), available at: www4.unfccc.int/sites/NAPC/Documents/Parties/Kiribati-Joint-Implementation-Plan-for-Climate-Change-and-Disaster-Risk-Management-2019-2028.pdf, p.146

15 Government of Samoa, *National Disaster Management Plan 2017–2020* (2017) 14, available at: www.mnre.gov.ws/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Samoa-national-disaster-management-plan-2017-2020-final-web.pdf.

16 Government of Tuvalu, (2012). *Te Kaniva: Tuvalu Climate Change Policy 2012–2021* (2012) 25f, available at: www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/TUV_2012_Te_Kaniva_CCpolicy.pdf.

17 Government of Kiribati, above n12, p.12.

18 *Ibid.*, p.18. Note that the KJIP is more specific, also with respect to how to handle land loss.

19 *Ibid.*, p.19.

20 Government of Samoa, above n15, p.14.

21 *Ibid.*, p.35

22 *Ibid.*, p.14.

23 *Ibid.*, pp.23, 29, 32.

24 *Ibid.*, p.61.



Mike and Alice are villagers from Killerton, Papua New Guinea, where they live in the house they built themselves several years ago. They were displaced from their village when a flood tore through it in 2007. © IOM 2016/Mohammed MUSE

and working on an international framework for the cross-border movement of its affected population,²⁵ though it does not specify how these measure are to be implemented or achieved.

We conclude that recent and current national policy instruments pertaining to climate change and disaster risk management are sites in which concerns about mobility related issues stemming from climate change are voiced and recorded. Some nuance as to different types of mobility are captured – for example internal versus external. That said, with few exceptions, the instruments we surveyed are not sites where such concerns find concrete policy treatment or resolution. The relevant instruments are, by and large, too general to achieve this, amounting to framework instruments that set out broad policy rather than actionable policy direction. Most of them are geared towards comprehensively raising a whole host of challenges which climate change and recurring disasters bring to the Pacific Islands region, of which mobility is just one. We do not necessarily suggest that mobility needs to be artificially teased out among a host of other challenges, but rather that where mobility is raised in these policies, more detail specifying how measures will be implemented may be helpful, especially where instruments dedicated to mobility in the context of climate change are not available.

MOBILITY IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

In addition to mobility appearing in Pacific Island policy instruments concerned with climate change and disaster risk management, mobility is also mentioned in some regional nations' current (or recent) national development policy instruments in ways that are (or could be) relevant to climate change (n=10). This includes international development policy in metropolitan countries New Zealand and Australia.

In the small island nations themselves, Solomon Islands' National Development Strategy 2016–2025 holds, for example, that one of the nation's medium-term objectives is to "[i]mprove disaster and climate risk management including prevention, risk reduction, preparedness, response and recovery and adaptation as part of resilient development".²⁶ One of the strategies by which this could be achieved is noted to be resettlement of small island communities.²⁷ Tonga's National Strategic Development Framework 2015–2025 acknowledges that inclusive and sustainable growth is dependent on "a more inclusive, sustainable and effective land administration, environment management, and resilience to climate and risk."²⁸ It goes on to note that both emigration and immigration have an impact on overall development. Should fertility remain high, and immigration channels limited, the Framework raises concerns about development impacts. Similarly, ongoing rural to urban migration is noted as a development opportunity but also a

25 Government of Tuvalu, above n16, p.26.

26 Government of Solomon Islands, (2016). *National Development Strategy 2016–2035*, available at: www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cobp-sol-2017-2019-ld-01.pdf. p.14.

27 Ibid, p.43.

28 Government of Tonga, (2015). *National Strategic Development Framework 2015–2025*, available at: www.extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ton168846.pdf. p.18.

challenge, both in places of origin and destination (often the biggest island, Tongatapu). The Framework notes that "[t]hese developments have also increased the risk and potential vulnerability of people living in these areas to extreme natural events,"²⁹ which it notes elsewhere are expected to worsen with climate change.³⁰ Tonga has a significant diaspora, but the report also highlights the risk that growing anti-immigration sentiment in those places where the diaspora resides could cut long-term emigration options and with it remittances and overseas employment opportunities.³¹

We note, here again, that concrete policy direction regarding mobility issues raised was not always explicit in the policy instruments pertaining to development we looked at in Pacific island nations. In some ways, this is because policy direction for countries in the regions was identified to depend on the policy decisions pertaining to immigration, including cross-border labour-related migration, of other (migration destination) sovereign nations. In other words, concrete policy direction was missing because the instruments we identified were purposely set out as framework instruments – and thus as "rough" guidance for national development. This was, for example, the case with Tonga's Framework instrument. It is also true for the regional *Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific 2017–2030*,³² which offers overall guidelines for approaching development in the region through addressing climate change and disaster risk management. The Framework suggests a host of broad actions to be taken by various stakeholders at the national or regional level to build disaster and climate change resilience, and this includes labour migration and relocation.³³ In the same vein, *Solomon Islands National Development Strategy* does not elaborate on

resettlement of communities, other than noting it as a strategy for risk reduction or adaptation.

That said, where Solomon Island's Strategy is more explicit is with regards to cross-border labour migration. It notes that:

*Labour migration offers opportunities for improved incomes for Solomon Islanders. There is a strong demand for skilled and unskilled migrant workers in the developed world particularly in horticulture, construction, health, domestic services and hospitality sectors. Matching these needs with the supply of skilled and low-skilled labour will bring mutual benefits for sending and host countries. However, the movement of people also has a range of social impacts that need to be taken into account by policymakers.*³⁴

Tonga proposes that those members of its diaspora that have found opportunity elsewhere "help develop the social and economic quality of life" of Tongans in-situ and within the diaspora,³⁵ not least through the spread of remittances.

Neither Solomon Islands' nor Tonga's³⁶ instrument discussed here ties cross-border labour mobility expressly to climate change. The fact that such mobility schemes can nevertheless have a climate change adaptation dimension has not otherwise escaped the attention of policymakers, researchers and others.³⁷ The benefits sometimes touted include: remittance generation, knowledge transfer and decreasing population pressure,³⁸ all of which have been acknowledged to have at least the potential to have positive development as well as climate change adaptation benefits.

29 Ibid, p.37.

30 Ibid, p.43.

31 Ibid, p.44.

32 Pacific Community (SPC), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and University of the South Pacific (USP), (2016). *Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific 2017–2030*, available at: www.te-pa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/FRDP_2016_finalResilient_Dev_pacific.pdf.

33 Ibid, p.15.

34 Government of Solomon Islands, above n 26, p.21.

35 Government of Tonga, above n28, p.69.

36 Though note Tonga's more recent migration policy, tied to sustainable development; below at gsd.spc.int/frdp/assets/FRDP_2016_Resilient_Dev_pacific.pdf 48.

Note also Solomon Islands has a labour mobility strategy; it does not, however, link to climate change; see Government of Solomon Islands, (2018). *Labour Mobility Strategy – 2019–2023*, available at: www.mfaet.gov.sb/resources/strategies-policies/30-lmu/72-labour-mobility-strategy-2019-2023.html. This is also true for Vanuatu' similar policy; see Government of Vanuatu, (2019). *National Labour Mobility Policy*, not publicly accessible at time of publication.

37 For example Mariya Gromilova, (2015). "Can the EU Seasonal Workers' Directive Alleviate the Pending Crisis of Climate-Induced Displacement: Lessons from Oceania", *European Labour Law Journal* 292–320; also Richard Bedford et al. (2017). "Managed Temporary Labour Migration of Pacific Islanders to Australia and New Zealand in the Early 21st Century", *Australian Geographer* 37–57, Olivia Dun et al. (2018). "Recognising Knowledge Transfers in "Unskilled" and "Low-skilled" International Migration: Insights from Pacific Island Seasonal Workers in Rural Australia", *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 59:276–292, Christine Brickenstein and Gil Marvel Tabucanon, "Circular Migration as Climate Change Adaptation: Reconceptualising New Zealand's and Australia's Seasonal Worker Programs" (2014) *Precedente al.* (2018). *Revista Juridica* 7–34, and International Labour Organization (ILO), *Climate Change, Displacement and Labour Migration*, available at: www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/climate-change/green-jobs/lang--en/index.htm.

38 ILO, above n37.

In the region, Australia and New Zealand both have seasonal or circular labour migration schemes targeted at the Pacific Islands. New Zealand's Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme³⁹ commenced in 2007 and permits citizens of Pacific partner countries⁴⁰ to fill perceived shortages in the New Zealand labour market, especially in horticultural and viticultural industries. The capped scheme is operated by New Zealand Immigration and workers can seek employment for 7 out of 11 months per year (9 out of 11 months for Kiribati and Tuvalu on account of distance). Australia's Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP)⁴¹ emulates New Zealand's RSE. It commenced in 2012 (following a three year pilot scheme) and citizens of mostly Pacific Island target countries⁴² can take up low or unskilled seasonal labour in Australia, in sectors including agri- or aqua-culture and accommodation. The scheme is operated by the recently reconfigured Department of Education, Skills and Employment and participation is available for 9 out of 12 months in any year, with a return possible. More recently, citizens of target countries⁴³ have also been able to access Australia's uncapped Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS), which complements the SWP but is operated under the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) through their Pacific Labour Facility. Workers are able to take up low and also semi-skilled work opportunities (for example, in agriculture, hospitality, aged care, meat processing, etc.) in rural and regional Australia for 12 to 36 months at a time. A systematic literature review by Underhill-Sem and Marsters of 190 research studies into different aspects of international labour mobility schemes between Pacific countries and New Zealand and Australia specifically focused on the development impacts, outcomes and contributions for Pacific countries and pointed to the "transformative effects" of these schemes on development for Pacific countries.⁴⁴

In light of the opportunities provided by Australia's and New Zealand's⁴⁵ seasonal or circular labour mobility

policies, some Pacific islands countries have set up corresponding policies to facilitate the participation of their citizens in the schemes. Tuvalu's *National Labour Migration Policy*,⁴⁶ for example, is designed to provide a coherent strategy for promoting overseas employment and protecting the welfare of Tuvaluan citizens abroad. It revolves around a coordinated, whole-of-government approach, including consultation with island communities, and mainstreaming labour migration into national development policies.

Unlike Australian and New Zealand seasonal or circular labour mobility policies, Tuvalu's national labour migration policy includes climate change amongst the challenges driving the perceived need for overseas labour migration:

"The importance of labour migration as an option for our people is likely to increase further still as climate change continues to batter at our shores and wreak havoc on rain patterns, groundwater and oceans, impacting on subsistence agriculture and other livelihoods options."⁴⁷

The same is true of the labour mobility policy of Kiribati and emerging ones such as that of Tonga, the latter only recently launched, which recognize the role of labour mobility in countering the effects of climate change.

We conclude that current policy instruments pertaining to development are spaces in which recognition of mobility related issues stemming from climate or environmental change are recognized and beginning to be operationalized. For the most part, such instruments are not sites where such concerns find concrete policy treatment or resolution. There is one exception, labour mobility is elaborated, fairly extensively, in at least some of the policy instruments we looked at, both those in island nations and

39 New Zealand Immigration, (2020). *Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme*, available at: www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/research-and-statistics/research-reports/recognised-seasonal-employer-rse-scheme.

40 Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

41 Government of Australia, (2020). *Seasonal Worker Programme*, available at: www.dese.gov.au/seasonal-worker-programme.

42 Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

43 Kiribati, Nauru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu - to be expanded to other countries.

44 Yvonne Underhill-Sem and Evelyn Marsters, (2017). "Labour Mobility in the Pacific: A Systematic Literature Review of Development Impacts"(New Zealand Institute for Pacific Research (NZIPR), Auckland, 2017); the authors also note that research over long periods of time is required to fully understand the effects.

45 But also, e.g. the United States' Temporary Labor Certification schemes (www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/employers/guest-workers and Canada's Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/foreign-workers/agricultural/seasonal-agricultural.html).

46 Government of Tuvalu, *Tuvalu National Labour Migration Policy*, available at: www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Tuvalu%20National%20Migration%20Labour%20Policy.pdf.

47 Ibid, p.iii.

48 Government of Kiribati, (2019). *Kiribati National Labour Migration Policy*, available at: www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Kiribati%20National%20Labour%20Migration%20Policy.pdf and Government of Tonga, *Migration and Sustainable Development Policy*, not yet published; see also Matangi Tonga Online, (2021). "PM Launches Tonga's First Tonga Labour Mobility Policy", available at: matangitonga.to/2021/02/04/pm-launches-first-tonga-labour-mobility-policy.



IOM staff carry out an NFI distribution to flood affected IDPs in Killerton, Popondetta province of Papua New Guinea. © IOM 2016/Mohammed MUSE

metropolitan neighbours. The development potential of this type of mobility is readily acknowledged. Explicit links to climate change are only sometimes established⁴⁹ (e.g. Tuvalu's policy), though they are undoubtedly apparent and have also been revealed elsewhere.⁵⁰

EMERGING DEDICATED DISASTER AND CLIMATE CHANGE MOBILITY POLICIES

The policy instruments introduced so far have often lacked specificity when it comes to mobility in the context of climate change in the Pacific. Filling this gap have been recent policies in some countries dedicated to displacement or relocation stemming from the effects of disasters and/or climate change (n=3).

In 2018, the Fijian Government published its Planned Relocation Guidelines (PRG),⁵¹ which are to guide relocations related to climate change in the nation. This was a world-first. The instrument is to provide guidance to government bodies and all other stakeholders in planned⁵² relocations. It considers planned relocation a last resort adaptation option, to be engaged in once all other in situ options available under its National Climate Change Policy have been exhausted.⁵³ So far, the Fijian Government has identified dozens of

communities for relocation, mostly low-lying coastal sites subject to inundation and shoreline erosion, as well as saltwater intrusion – often in conjunction with compounding factors including pollution, overcrowding and environmental degradation that precedes the effects of climatic change.⁵⁴ To date, four iTaukei (Indigenous) communities have initiated the relocation of their communities and only one has been completed.⁵⁵

The PRG is to be viewed as a step-by-step guide for relocation by affected communities, State actors and non-State actors. It is to be applied in conjunction with Standard Operating Procedures, publication of which is imminent, and which will outline the details of implementation. The PRG itself is divided into two parts, the first of which focuses on principles which are to guide planned relocations, the second of which focuses on the three stages in the relocation process – prior, during and after. Part I highlights that relocation is to proceed along three "pillars":

1. Decision; 2. Planning, to be guided by principles of sustainability; and 3. Implementation, to be sustainable and followed by monitoring.⁵⁶ Activities, under each pillar, must adhere to the following principles so that they are: ethical, bottom-up, community and household livelihoods-based, rights-based by adhering to the provisions of the two main international rights

49 For example Elise Remling, (2020). "Migration as Climate Adaptation? Exploring Discourses Amongst Development Actors in the Pacific Island Region", *Regional Environmental Change* 1–13; also Mariya Gromilova, (2015). "Can the EU Seasonal Workers' Directive Alleviate the Pending Crisis of Climate-Induced Displacement: Lessons from Oceania", *European Labour Law Journal*, 6:292–320.

50 Jillian Ash and Jillian Campbell, (2016). "Climate Change and Migration: The Case of the Pacific Islands and Australia", *Journal of Pacific Island Studies*, 36: 53–71.

51 Government of Fiji, (2018). *Planned Relocation Guidelines: A Framework to Undertake Climate Change Related Relocation*, available at: www.refworld.org/docid/5c3c92204.html [developed with the assistance of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ)].

52 State-led, as opposed to community-led.

53 Ibid, p.5.

54 Ibid, p.7.

55 The village of Vunidogoloa in Vanua Levu, Fiji.

56 Government of Fiji, above n51, p.8.

covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR) and matters of participation and transparency, preemptive in the sense that humanitarian catastrophes must be prevented, as well as regional in the sense that they must conform with relevant regional norms and policy.⁵⁷

Part II then enumerates the noted three stages of relocation: prior, during and after – and the guidelines for government and other actors each entails. Pre-relocation, the PRG highlights establishing the necessity for relocation and the establishment of timing and methods for relocation, as well as transparency, consultation, participation and collaboration in any proceedings.⁵⁸ During relocation, the PRG highlights transparent communication about logistics amongst all involved, continued access between former and new place of habitation where possible, human rights adherence, not least in relation to vulnerable populations, data collection for the purposes of improving future relocations, the facilitation of community coherence, and good communication between all involved.⁵⁹ The section on the post-relocation period emphasizes continued monitoring to establish that there have been improvements to standards of living, to record and learn from experience and build capacity, and to continue with adaptation measure – both for the purpose of community integration and capacity-building in the new site and preparation for future hazards.⁶⁰ Importantly, the final section notes that all stakeholders must work together so that services are provided, and negative impacts prevented for those who have moved, for those who may host relocated persons and also for those who have decided not to take part in planned relocation.⁶¹

In 2019, Fiji followed its PRG with the establishment of the *Relocation Trust Fund for People Displaced by Climate Change*.⁶² Seed funding in the order of five million dollars per annum would come from the Fijian Government, via an allocation of a percentage of the revenue from its Environment and Climate Adaptation Levy.⁶³ The Government has also expressed the hope that international partners would further support the scheme as part of their efforts⁶⁴ to support the country's adaptation efforts. By early 2020, international pledges began to materialize; New Zealand has gone first by offering USD 2 million (approximately NZD 3 million) in support.⁶⁵

This aligns with New Zealand's "Pacific Climate Change-Related Displacement and Migration: A New Zealand Action Plan", first outlined in a position paper by Foreign Minister Winston Peters in 2018.⁶⁶ The Plan includes actions such as the utilization of development assistance for the purpose of averting, delaying or preparing for migration or displacement, to lobby the international law community for relevant policy developments and to facilitate regional dialogue.⁶⁷ The Plan supplants an earlier New Zealand policy proposal following national elections in 2017, which concerned the issuance of humanitarian visas for Pacific Islanders displaced by the effects of climate change (up to 100 per year).⁶⁸ This policy did not materialize, not least because the affected countries in the region have indicated that something akin to refugeehood is not desired.⁶⁹

In early 2020, Fiji also issued *Displacement Guideline in the Context of Climate Change and Disasters*,⁷⁰ to complement its earlier Relocation Guidelines. It

57 Ibid, p.8. It is not stated what they are.

58 Ibid, p.12.

59 Ibid, p.13.

60 Ibid, p.14.

61 Ibid, p.15.

62 Permanent Mission of Fiji to the United Nations, (25 Sept 2019). *World's First-Ever Relocation Trust Fund for People Displaced by Climate Change Launched by Fijian Prime Minister*, available at: www.un.int/fiji/news/world%E2%80%99s-first-%E2%80%93ever-relocation-trust-fund-people-displaced-climate-change-launched-fijian-prime.

63 ReliefWeb, (24 Sept 2019). *Official Launch of Fiji's Climate Relocation and Displaced Peoples Trust Fund for Communities and Infrastructure*, available at: reliefweb.int/report/fiji/official-launch-fiji-s-climate-relocation-and-displaced-peoples-trust-fund-communities.

64 Permanent Mission of Fiji to the United Nations, above n 62.

65 SBS News, *New Zealand Commits Millions to Climate Relocation Fund for Fiji* (27 Feb 2020) available at: www.sbs.com.au/news/new-zealand-commits-millions-to-climate-relocation-fund-for-fiji.

66 Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, (May 2018). "Pacific Climate Change-Related Displacement and Migration: A New Zealand Proposed Action Plan", available at: www.apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2018-05/apo-nid213946.pdf. [this is a policy proposal, but it does reflect New Zealand's pronounced interest in the issue of climate-change related migration and displacement in the region].

67 Ibid, p.1.

68 Detailed analysis by Leandra Fiennes, *New Zealand's Climate Refugee Visa – A Framework for Positive Change* (Dissertation, University of Otago, 2019) available at: www.otago.ac.nz/law/research/journals/otago734244.pdf.

69 Helen Dempster and Kayly Ober, "New Zealand's "Climate Refugee" Visa: Lessons for the Rest of the World", *Center for Global Development* (10 Jan 2020) available at: www.cgdev.org/blog/new-zealands-climate-refugee-visas-lessons-rest-world.

70 Government of Fiji, (2020). *Displacement Guidelines: In the Context of Climate Change and Disasters*, available at: www.adaptationcommunity.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Displacement-Guidelines-Fiji-2019.pdf [also developed with the assistance of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH].

acknowledges that different processes are involved in the different types of mobility. In substance, the newer Guidelines take the same approach as the earlier ones – Part I enumerates Principles, including that a rights-based, livelihoods-based and capacity-building approach ought to be taken, and Part II again enumerates three stages, in this case of displacement: prior, during and after – and the guidelines for government and other actors each entails.

Vanuatu is another country which has published a policy dedicated to displacement induced by climate change and disasters in 2018.⁷¹ Its *National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement* revolves around 12 Strategic Priority Areas (SPA). The first four are focused on system-level interventions and include: institutions and governance; evidence, information and monitoring; safeguards and protections; and capacity-building, training and resources. The final eight are focused on sectoral-level interventions and include: safety and security; land, housing, planning and environment, health, nutrition and psychosocial well-being; education; infrastructure and connectivity; agriculture, food security and livelihoods; traditional knowledge, culture and documentation; and access to justice and public participation.⁷² Broader guiding principles are also identified – for instance, gender equity, protection of traditional knowledge and respect for custom, as well as adherence to human rights protections.⁷³

The premise of the policy is that displacement and human mobility more broadly are mainstreamed into policy planning and implementation at all levels. The document is longer and more detailed than Fiji's PRG. Its aims include: minimizing of displacement drivers; minimizing the impact of relocation or displacement; creating durable solutions for displaced persons; ensuring participation and informed but voluntary choices by such persons; facilitating well-managed and safe migration; promoting access to affordable housing and tenure security; and integrating human mobility considerations into the work policy of a range of sectors.⁷⁴ Each SPA identifies key agencies to be involved in its implementation. A Lead Ministry is to be identified, with Annex E detailing the Terms of Reference to guide its work. The goal for each SPA

is to roll out a series of actions – some immediately, some longer term, and some as required. Ultimately, Vanuatu's policy does not set out to create a new policy space; rather, it seeks to ensure that existing actors and policy planning and implementation processes integrate human mobility concerns, especially as they arise in the context of disasters and climate change, into their existing work. Standard Operating Procedures to support the practical implementation of the policy are expected soon.

To conclude, the emergence of policy instruments dedicated to mobility in the climate change context is apparent in the Pacific region. This fills an important policy gap and lends specificity to policy developments that are lacking in other instruments (namely, that is development, climate change/disaster policy). In Fiji's dedicated instruments, policy commitment to transparent, participatory and rights-based relocation is coupled with a commitment to source and provide the financial resources this requires. Vanuatu's dedicated policy instrument, meanwhile, carefully outlines how mobility concerns stemming from disasters and climate change must be mainstreamed into planning and operations in other policy arenas. Mobility does not operate independently of other concerns and thus an integrated approach strikes us as sensible, one that other countries in the region working on similar policies may wish to emulate.

GEOPOLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS, IMMIGRATION TIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MOBILITY

A final policy area that ought to be addressed concerns the fact that many of the island nations have dedicated mobility ties with other states (beyond the temporary labour migration channels we have already noted), often stemming from geopolitical associations (n=13) or otherwise unique immigration arrangements (n=5) with metropolitan neighbours mostly located on the region's fringe, such as New Zealand and the United States (but also France and the United Kingdom). Not all 22 island nations we surveyed are, in fact, fully independent nation States. This has ramifications for the mobility options available to many of the region's inhabitants.

(GIZ)].

71 Government of Vanuatu, (2018). *National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement*, available at: www.environmentalmigration.iom.int/vanuatu-national-policy-climate-change-and-disaster-induced-displacement-2018 [developed with IOM].

72 Ibid, p.8.

73 Ibid, p.17.

74 Ibid, p.18.



IOM visits the remote village of Simbu province. © IOM 2016/Mohammed MUSE

Some of those nations not fully independent are in free association with another State. For example, the Cook Islands and Niue, recognized as independent or de facto States by some and as self-governing territories by others, are in free association with New Zealand and their nationals are automatically citizens of that country, with the associated rights of movement. Otherwise, the region hosts a number of non-sovereign territories – some are federal territories of sovereign States (for example American Samoa), some are otherwise dependent (for example, Tokelau is a dependent territory of New Zealand; New Caledonia, French Polynesia and others are French administrative divisions). The point here is not to discuss the various degrees of sovereignty (or lack thereof) of the entities concerned, but to highlight that with their ties come the privileges of movement for some in the region but not others. There is evidence that these privileges are utilized in the context of climate change.

There are reports,⁷⁵ for example, that citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia, one of several regional nations in free association with the United States, which supports rights of indefinite residence and employment in the United States,⁷⁶ are now migrating to the United States mainland due to

growing pressures associated with climate change. Although the mobility opportunities this presents has limitations – e.g. getting to the United States mainland is resource-dependent, United States authorities can prevent or curtail a stay on various grounds, including health,⁷⁷ and the migrants involved note difficulties with adjustment and the experience of loss⁷⁸ - the (relatively) unimpeded open borders approach that is involved clearly provides benefits where evading the consequences of climate change in a small island setting is desired.⁷⁹ These type of benefits, which sometimes support movement that goes in both directions,⁸⁰ could become part of policy developments beyond the realm of existing free associations or arrangements like it, forming the basis, for example, of a broader regional framework that benefits those who currently cannot rely on mobility arrangements stemming from historical links between nations.

Beyond geopolitical associations, some of the region's nations otherwise have unique immigration ties with metropolitan states. This is particularly the case with New Zealand, whose *Pacific Access Category*⁸¹ (PAC) provides for dedicated, ballot-based mobility channels for citizens of Fiji, Kiribati, Tonga and Tuvalu, and, similarly, for citizens of Samoa under the *Samoan*

75 See above n 11; also Jon Barnett and Celia McMichael, (2018). "The Effects of Climate Change on the Geography and Timing of Human Mobility", *Population and Environment* 39:339–356.

76 US Citizenship and Immigration Services, (2019). *Fact Sheet: Status of the Citizens of the Freely Associated States of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands*, available at: www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/fact-sheets/FactSheet-Status_of_Citizens_of_Micronesia_Marshalls_Islands.pdf.

77 See also, Briana Dema, (2012). "Sea Level Rise and the Freely Associated States: Addressing Environmental Migration Under the Compact of Free Association", *Columbia Journal of Environmental Law*, Vol. 3, p.177, p.199.

78 Serio Olmos, above n11.

79 Though note: Federated States of Micronesia's second communications to the UNFCCC highlights the fact that the rights of people moving under its Compact of Free Association with the United States are not the same as the rights of citizens, which is critical for those considering permanent movement in the context of climate change.

80 For example, Barnett and McMichael, above n 75, who discuss this with respect to Niue.

81 New Zealand Immigration, (2020). *Information About: Pacific Access Category Resident Visa*, information available at: www.immigration.govt.nz/new-zealand-visas/apply-for-a-visa/visa-factsheet/pacific-access-category-resident-visa?_ga=2.1559345.188622492.1599005643-1760606886.1599005643.

Quota.⁸² These schemes are quota-based, dependent on a full-time job offer, minimum income criteria, English language capacity, and limited to certain age groups (18–45). Despite these challenges upon uptake, they provide a mobility option for hundreds of Pacific Island nationals every year⁸³ (beyond the limitations imposed by COVID-19). Metropolitan nations New Zealand and Australia themselves have special immigration ties, that allow for relatively unimpeded mobility for the citizens of either country – including rights of residence and employment.⁸⁴ These arrangements are not presently underpinned by climate change thinking, even though neither country has been (or will be) unaffected by the effects of climate change; the potential benefits from the perspective of mobility as climate change adaptation are apparent.

INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND CLIMATE CHANGE MOBILITY

This brief has focused on the national policy space. But, of course, there are significant policy developments, in particular internationally, in which Pacific Island nations are also engaged (some of which they drive; for example, under the UNFCCC) or which have policy ramifications for them in the national sphere. The international policy space has not been our focus here, but we wish to sketch briefly some core policy tools and processes, three of which strike us as highly relevant.

First, Pacific Island nation states are parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Paris Agreement concluded under its umbrella agreed at the end of 2015 that the Warsaw Mechanism's⁸⁵ Executive Committee would establish a Task Force on Displacement to work with relevant bodies (internal and external to the UNFCCC) to "develop recommendations for integrated approaches

to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change".⁸⁶ Initially, it was to rely on science and evidence in order to "[i]dentify legal, policy and institutional challenges", as well as "good practices" and "lessons learned".⁸⁷ More recently, its sphere to act has enhanced,⁸⁸ to include the identification and collation of best practice, as well to provide "[e]nhanced support for formulating laws, policies and strategies that reflect efforts to avert, minimize and address displacement."⁸⁹ This process is underway and influences domestic and regional policy development and application. It is supported by funding channels which support adaptation efforts, not least of developing and least-developed countries.⁹⁰

Second, the United Nations General Assembly in 2018 adopted a *Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration*.⁹¹ Its Objective two concerns the minimizing of adverse drivers and structural factors which compel people to leave countries of origin. One subsection is devoted to natural disasters, climate change and environmental change. Here, a host of policy commitments are made, which include: information sharing (sec 18h), developing adaptation and resilience strategies (sec 18i), disaster preparedness and cooperation across borders (sec 18j), and harmonized approaches at the regional and sub-regional level (sec 18k). Equally important, its Objective five calls for the establishment of both humanitarian entry and stay in the context of disasters.

Third, an *Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change*,⁹² which arose out of the Nansen Initiative process, was endorsed by over one hundred nation states in October 2015, including many based in the Pacific Islands region. It emerged from comprehensive global consultations (performed at regional scale, including in the Pacific) and charts concrete steps

82 New Zealand Immigration, (2020). *Information About: Samoan Quota Resident Visa*, information available at: www.immigration.govt.nz/new-zealand-visas/apply-for-a-visa/visa-factsheet/samoan-quota-scheme-resident-visa?_ga=2.94300829.188622492.1599005643-1760606886.1599005643.

83 For the PAC – annual slots: 75 Kiribati, 75 Tuvalu, 250 Tonga, 250 Fiji; for the Samoan Quota – annual slots: 1,100.

84 See, e.g., Parliament of Australia, (2016). *New Zealanders in Australia*, available at: www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1920/Quick_Guides/NewZealandersInAustralia

85 Warsaw Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts.

86 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (2016). *Adoption of the Paris Agreement*, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (29 January 2016), at para 49.

87 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (2017). *Terms of Reference of the Task Force on Displacement*, at para 6(a) and (d), available at: unfccc.int/files/adaptation/groups_committees/loss_and_damage_executive_committee/application/pdf/tor_task_force.pdf.

88 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (2019). "Task Force on Displacement: Plan of Action for 2019 – 2021" in *Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts – Addendum*, FCCC/SB/2019/5/Add.1 (15 November 2019).

89 Ibid, p.10.

90 For example *Climate Funds Update* (2020) available at: www.climatefundsupdate.org/.

91 United Nations General Assembly, *Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration*, A/CONF.231.3 (30 July 2018).

92 The Nansen Initiative, (2015). *Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change*, available at: www.nanseninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PROTECTION-AGENDA-VOLUME-1.pdf.

to address displacement in the context of natural disasters, both across borders and in-country. The result of a State-led process, it continues to be advanced via the Platform on Disaster Displacement as of 2017,⁹³ which works with individual nations and regions on the policy development concerning climate-related mobility.

Much of this is broad and non-binding upon States. It nevertheless sketches some core strategies that individual members may want to pursue, in an effort to minimize the mobility consequences of climate change and natural disasters.

GAPS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Mobility concerns associated with climate change in the Pacific Islands region are prevalent. At the national policy level, these concerns are expressed across multiple policy spheres – for instances, climate change, risk management, and/or development. Addressing these concerns has become a policy priority, at least for some countries in the region. In climate and disaster risk management policy or development policy this is done broadly, with mostly general policy sketched out. An exception in development policy is labour migration, which is understood to provide a promising avenue for mobility to counter development challenges and environmental risks and impacts in the region, and about which more detailed policy instruments or provision exist – both in sending and receiving nations. We suggest that the potential to alleviate pressures arising from climate change could become a more visible

dimension of these policies.⁹⁴ In two nations in the region, policies dedicated to internal mobility (namely, that is displacement and relocation) in the context of climate change or disasters have emerged. This tends to be detailed in terms of what steps public authorities and other stakeholders ought to engage in to ensure successful and rights-based mobility, in particular that which is planned, facilitated, or supported by government. Fiji’s instruments are rights-based and this should play an important part in ensuring the rights-based movement of people by Government, as well as permitting people to stay put where desired. Vanuatu’s instrument also pays attention to rights and equity, but it is more focused on how existing policy frameworks and actors can integrate mobility arising from climate change and disasters into their existing planning and processes. We conclude that this sets out a valuable and transformational approach, which might benefit from being repeated elsewhere. It is one that is simultaneously detailed, rights-based, identifies a responsible public authority, pays attention to multiple mobility stages, requires actors in different policy spheres to liaise and cooperate, and allows for people to stay home or as close to home as possible, which is often desired. We also looked at existing associations and immigration ties that regional nations have with other States. We conclude that the removal of barriers to mobility these involve is clearly beneficial when considering climate change mobility. Finally, Pacific Island nation States engage in, sometimes drive, and are impacted by important developments in the international policy sphere, with some links between the domestic and international spheres apparent.

93 See Platform on Disaster Displacement (2020) available at: www.disasterdisplacement.org.

94 Olivia Dun, Celia McMichael, Karen McNamara and Carol Farbotko, (2020). "Investing in Home: Development Outcomes and Climate Change Adaptation for Seasonal Workers Living between Solomon Islands and Australia", *Migration and Development*, 10.1080/21632324.2020.1837535.



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APPENDIX 1

National Policies Considered

AMERICA SAMOA

Territorial Climate Change Adaptation Framework 2012

www.data.nodc.noaa.gov/coris/library/NOAA/CRCP/other/grants/NA11NOS4820008/ClimateChange_Adapt_Framework.pdf

Climate Change Adaptation Policy in the United States Affiliated Pacific Islands 2017

piccc.net/piccc/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Climate-Change-Adaptation-Planning-in-the-USAPI-20171.pdf

AUSTRALIA

Australia–Kiribati Partnership for Development 2009

www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/development-assistance/partnerships/Pages/kiribati.aspx.

COOK ISLANDS

Disaster Management Act 2007

extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/cok138161.pdf

Cook Islands Climate Change Policy Assessment Report 2013

ccprojects.gsd.spc.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CI5-Cook-Islands-CC-Profile-v2.pdf

Climate & Disaster Compatible Development Report 2013–2016

www.mfem.gov.ck/images/Climate__Disaster-Compatible_Development_Policy_Final_copy.pdf

National Sustainable Development Plan 2016–2020

www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cobp-coo-2017-2019-ld-01.pdf

Second Joint National Action Plan: A sectoral approach to Climate Change & Disaster Risk Management Plan 2016–2020

policy.asiapacificenergy.org/sites/default/files/The%20Cook%20Islands%202nd%20Joint%20National%20Action%20Plan%202016-2020.pdf

FEDERAL STATES OF MICRONESIA

Nationwide Integrated Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Policy 2013

fsm-data.sprep.org/dataset/fsm-nationwide-climate-change-and-disaster-risk-management-policy/resource/292e23cd-fd9c.

Climate Change Act 2014

www.pacificclimatechange.net/sites/default/files/documents/1.%20Act%20of%20Congress.pdf

Climate Change Adaptation Policy in the US Affiliated Pacific Islands 2017

piccc.net/piccc/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Climate-Change-Adaptation-Planning-in-the-USAPI-20171.pdf

Strategic Development Plan 2004–2023

www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cobp-fsm-2015-2017-sd-02.pdf

Fiji

National Development Policy 2017

www.fiji.gov.fj/getattachment/15b0ba03-825e-47f7-bf69-094ad33004dd/5-Year---20-Year-NATIONAL-DEVELOPMENT-PLAN.aspx.

Planned Relocation Guidelines: A Framework to undertake Climate Change Related Relocation 2018

cop23.com.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/CC-PRG-BOOKLET-22-1.pdf

Displacement Guidelines: In the Context of Climate Change and Disasters 2019

www.adaptationcommunity.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Displacement-Guidelines-Fiji-2019.pdf

Climate Change & Health Strategic Action Plan 2016–2020

www.health.gov.fj/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Climate-Change-and-Health-Strategic-Action-Plan-2016-2020.pdf

Republic of Fiji National Climate Change Policy 2018–2030

www.sprep.org/attachments/Climate_Change/Fiji-National-Climate-Change-Policy.pdf

FRENCH POLYNESIA**Pacific Territories Initiative for Regional Management of the Environment Action Plan 2014–2018**

integre.spc.int/images/pdf/INTEGRE/telechargements/Action_Plan_French_Polynesia.pdf

French Polynesia and WHO Country Cooperation Strategy 2018–2022.

apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/259914/WPRO-2017-DPM-009-pyf-eng.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

GUAM**Marine Planning and Climate Change Policy 2015**

soest.hawaii.edu/illust/emergency/Pacific%20Islands%20Booklets%204-7-31-15/Guam-1/Guam%201.pdf

Climate Change Adaptation Policy in the US Affiliated Pacific Islands 2017

piccc.net/piccc/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Climate-Change-Adaptation-Planning-in-the-USAPI-20171.pdf

Guam Climate Change Preparedness and Resiliency Act 2017

[www.guamlegislature.com/Bills_Introduced_34th_access/Bill%20No.%2079-34%20\(COR\).docx](http://www.guamlegislature.com/Bills_Introduced_34th_access/Bill%20No.%2079-34%20(COR).docx)

KIRIBATI**Kiribati National Labour Migration Policy**

www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Kiribati%20National%20Labour%20Migration%20Policy.pdf

Kiribati Integrated Environmental Policy 2013

www.sprep.org/attachments/VirLib/Kiribati/KIEP.pdf

National Framework for Climate Change and Climate Adaptation 2013

www.president.gov.ki/presidentgovki/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/National-Framework-for-Climate-Change-Climate-Change-Adaptation.pdf

Kiribati Climate Change Policy 2019

extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/kir193352.pdf

Kiribati Development Plan 2016–2019

www.mfed.gov.ki/sites/default/files/Kiribati%20Development%20Plan%202016%20-%202019.pdf

Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Management 2014–2023

www.mfed.gov.ki/sites/default/files/KJIP%20BOOK%20WEB%20SINGLE_0.pdf

Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management 2019–2028

www.climate.gov.ki/category/action/adaptation/kiribati-adaptation-program/

NAURU**Republic of Nauru Framework for Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management 2015**

www.refworld.org/pdfid/5b3f74384.pdf

Nauru National Sustainable Development Strategy 2005–2025: Partnerships for Quality of Life

<https://www.sprep.org/att/IRC/eCOPIES/Countries/Nauru/2a.pdf>

NEW CALEDONIA

Energy Transition Scheme Planning and Development Scheme 2016–2030

www.policy.asiapacificenergy.org/node/3961.

NEW ZEALAND

Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme 2007

www.immigration.govt.nz/about-us/research-and-statistics/research-reports/recognised-seasonal-employer-rse-scheme.

Pacific Climate Change-Related Migration and Displacement: A New Zealand Action Plan 2018

Available Offline

NIUE

National Action Plan Addressing Land Degradation and Drought 2004

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DISCLAIMER

Publisher:

International Organization for Migration Fiji

FNPF Place, Level 5

GPO Box 14764

Suva, Fiji

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Email: iomfiji@iom.int


Website: www.iom.int

Required citation:

International Organization for Migration (IOM)

The views in this journal are those of the authors and don't necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration. Any errors or oversights in this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors.

ISBN 978-92-9268-017-6 (PDF) - Policy Developments and Options to Address Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Risk in the Pacific Islands Region | © IOM 2021



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